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Abstract
For some crimes the perpetrator can be detected costlessly but can only be ap-
prehended at significant cost, or not at all for some period of time. To deter strategic
behavior in the period between detection and apprehension, authorities may wish
to commit themselves to punishing the criminal once apprehended, regardless of the
perpetrator’s behavior or threats. However we show that such efforts at commit-
ment to ex post punishment may induce worse behavior and that it selects potential
criminals of a worse type. We show that when law enforcement authorities cannot
commit themselves perfectly, it is dangerous for them to try to commit as it may
invoke a strategic response that can worsen the situation. When law enforcement
authorities do increase their commitment to punish such offenders, it is likely to
lead to less but more gruesome crimes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a class of crime where standard deterrence models do not fit well. For some crimes,
the perpetrator can be costlessly detected but can only be apprehended at significant cost,
or not at all (for some period of time). Furthermore, during the period between detection
and apprehension the perpetrator may be able to inflict significant harm. This class of
crime includes kidnapping, ransom demands, and war crimes committed by despots and
warlords. Indeed, it applies to any circumstance where the wrongdoer is able to inflict
significant harm on an authority in the period between detection and apprehension.
The concept of marginal deterrence highlights the need to ensure that perpetrators
continue to face incremental punishments once they have begun a criminal activity such
as kidnapping (see Stigler 1970, Friedman and Sjostrom 1993, Mookherjee and Png 1994,
Shavell 1992, Detotto, et al. 2014 and 2015, Vannini, et al. 2015). However, sometimes,
given the perpetrator’s ability to inflict such a high degree of harm during the period
in-between detection and apprehension, authorities may be willing to give in (by allowing
an escape or offering an amnesty or asylum) for an end to the harmful behavior (or threats
of harmful behavior). In such cases, authorities are faced with a fundamental trade-off
between deterring such activity ex ante and ending the harmful behavior as painlessly
and quickly as possible ex post (eee Scharf 1999, Osiel 2000, Goldsmith 2003, Snyder
and Vinjamuri 2006, Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015). One seemingly sensible solution,
and consistent with the broad policy prescriptions of Kydland and Prescott (1997), is
to commit to punishing such behavior, regardless of the ability of the perpetrator to
inflict harm in the period between detection and apprehension. However, we show that in
such circumstances, commitments to punishing perpetrators may actually generate worse
criminal activity and a worse type of perpetrator committing them. This centers on the
idea that despite the authorities’ best intentions to commit to punishing a perpetrator,
they might ultimately find themselves unable as the costs of doing so are simply too high.
Knowing this, and acting strategically, perpetrators may commit more and worse crimes
in an effort to break the resolve to punish them.
Our analysis also builds on the signaling literature that contributes to the economic
analysis of the law (see Daughety and Reinganum [2017] for a recent survey). In particular,
our work is related to costly signaling models such as Chone and Limmemer (2010),
Jeitschko and Kim (2013) and Hubbard (2017). In Chone and Limmemer (2010), the
informed party’s investment choice provides a mechanism for signaling. There, plaintiffs
are able to overinvest in case preparation, which for ’weak’ types is tantamount to a
bluff. They find that the probability of a trial may decrease with the strength of the
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case such that ‘weak’ and ‘intermediate’ plaintiffs who make investments may face regret,
whereas ‘strong’ and ‘very weak’ plaintiffs never regret their investment decisions. In
the context of disclosure and discovery, Farmer and Pecorino (2013) have shown that a
weak player type may be willing to undertake a costly voluntary disclosure. In terms of
criminal law, much of the relevant literature focuses on plea-bargaining. One of the more
relevant earlier studies is that of Baker and Mezzetti (2001) who analyze the strategic
interaction between a defendant and a prosecutor during the plea bargaining process –
where the prosecutor can engage pre-trial investment. In their model, an increase in
prosecutor resources increases the proportion of guilty defendants who accept plea offers.
Moreover, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium where the plea offer is only accepted
by a proportion of the guilty defendants.
These aforementioned models hinge on the ability of the prosecutor or plaintiff to
credibly to go to trial. However, criminals’ or defendants’ signaling behavior is rarely (if
ever) contemplated. This is in sharp contrast to our own analysis which explores cases
where wrongdoers may be willing to invest in further wrongdoing to signal that they
are of a worse type than they actually are in order to induce the authority to renege
on its commitment to punish them. In this sense, the present study is relevant to the
threats, blackmailing, and extortion literature (see Shavell 1993, and Shavell and Spier
2002).We build on the work of Schwarz and Sonin (2008) by incorporating the concept of
brinkmanship into law enforcement in a two-period signaling game.
Our model is motivated by the observation of actual events. Consider kidnapping.
Although kidnappers typically threaten to kill the victim unless a ransom is paid, this
is not always their true intention.1 Consequently, authorities face an inference problem
on the type of the kidnappers, while kidnappers have an incentive to signal that they
are of the worst possible type (as that maximizes the probability that their demands will
be met). One of the most fitting examples is that of John Paul Getty III (see Brown
2011). This grandson of an oil tycoon was kidnapped in 1973 in Italy. Initially, Getty’s
grandfather refused to pay the ransom, referring to the risk of moral hazard: “I have
14 other grandchildren and if I pay one penny now, then I’ll have 14 kidnapped grand-
children.” The kidnappers recognized the problem and broke the stalemate by sending a
package containing Getty’s ear to a newspaper. The accompanying note read: “This is
Paul’s first ear. If within ten days the family still believes that this is a joke (...) then
the other ear will arrive. In other words, he will arrive in little bits.” After this, Getty
1Although those subject to demands often avoid taking any risk and pay a ransom, still about 18
percent of all victims are released alive by the kidnappers without any form of payment. In only 6
percent of all cases, the victim is actually killed (Australian Senate, 2011: 16).
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Sr. quickly changed his mind (realizing that being time-inconsistent was probably the
best option left) and paid $2.8 million for the return of his grandson. Following a wave of
kidnappings in the 1970s and 1980s Italy implemented a law in 1991 that froze the family
assets of hostages (increasing commitment to not paying a ransom). While the number of
kidnappings went down those that did take place were more gruesome and lasted longer
(Detotto et al., 2015). For example, in 1997 Italian authorities only gave in, and allowed
the family to pay a ransom, after the kidnapped Giuseppe Soffiantini had both of his ears
cut off. Because of the new law, receiving the first ear was apparently no longer enough
to break the ex-ante commitment to not paying anything.
Other examples relate to the administration of international justice. Following numer-
ous amnesty and asylum deals in the post World War II period, the permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2002 to try persons for acts of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.2 Countries party to the treaty are obliged
to cooperate with the ICC and are in principle no longer allowed to grant amnesty or
asylum to ICC-indicted individuals. In essence, signatories have committed themselves
to punishing perpetrators. However, in this new institutional environment some perpe-
trators have tested the resolve of authorities. For instance, soon after it emerged that
the Congolese government was going to enforce the ICC indictment of Bosco Ntaganda
(an infamous warlord known as ‘the Terminator’), his rebel group attacked the city of
Goma. According to a spokesman, they were not interested in control of the city, but
they wanted “the Congolese government [to] sit down at the negotiating table” (BBC
2012). While such a tactic may seem cavalier, and did ultimately fail, it is not without
logic. While the Rome Statute (that provides the legal framework underpinning the ICC)
generally binds states from offering amnesties or asylum, it contains explicit exemptions,
opening up the possibility for negotiation.3 Analogous forces seem to have been at work
in Zimbabwe, where members of Robert Mugabe’s former government were reportedly
“trying to force the political opposition into granting them amnesty for their past crimes
by abducting, detaining and torturing opposition officials and activists” (Dugger 2009)
- a striking statement which, as we will see later on, is exactly in line with our model’s
prediction.
Our analysis is built on the premise that although an authority’s loss associated with
giving in to a perpetrator increases with greater efforts at commitment (whether this be
2The practice of “trading justice for peace” was once encouraged by the United Nations as well (Scharf,
1999). Perhaps the most famous example is Idi Amin, one of the world’s most infamous dictators whose
regime is believed to have led to about 300,000 deaths in Uganda, spent his post-dictatorship years
comfortably in a Saudi Arabian hotel - dying there in 2003, without being held to account for his crimes.
3Specifically, see Articles 16, 17 and 53.
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the enactment of new binding laws against negotiating with kidnappers or the installation
of the ICC), it continues to be finite. Consequently, there still exists a critical level of
wrongdoing beyond which the authority chooses to take the loss associated with giving
in, rather than the pay-off resulting from sticking to its earlier threats to punish the
wrongdoer. We show that wrongdoers anticipating this may choose to commit more
crimes than they would actually like to from a static perspective, purely to worsen the
situation and “unlock” the impunity option. In doing so, they are essentially forcing the
authority to re-optimize. By behaving worse, wrongdoers can thus make their effective
punishment function non-monotonic. As a result of this effect, increasing the costs of
giving in may induce some criminals to commit more and more gruesome crimes, as that
becomes necessary to make the amnesty-option available to them. Importantly, it must
be stressed that this channel exists over and above any adverse consequences from a
wrongdoer digging in for survival if he or she believes that his exit route is blocked.
We proceed by first introducing our model in Section 2. Its implications are analyzed
in Section 3 and used to derive policy prescriptions. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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2 THE MODEL
This section presents our model. We start by describing the environment and solving the
model under perfect commitment (by which we gain understanding of our model). Then
we turn to a more realistic setup in which commitment is imperfect. The timing in our
model is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period 1, all potential criminals learn their type θ and decide
whether they want to attempt to commit a crime.
2. Given his or her type θ, a criminal commits a crime x1 during period 1.
3. At the beginning of period 2, the law enforcement authority forms an expectation
of his or her type, based upon first-period behavior x1. It subsequently decides
whether to bargain with the criminal or not.
4. If a bargain is offered and accepted, x2 = 0 and criminal obtains the value of the
bargain (e.g. free passage to a safe haven). If no deal is made, the criminal commits
further crimes x∗2 in period 2.
5. If no deal is made at Stage 4 the criminal is punished for any crimes that have been
committed in the past.
As the model is most easily explained backwards, we end by describing the entry decision
for potential criminals at the start of the game.
2.1 Model Environment and Solution under Perfect Commit-
ment
Our model consists of two periods, t = 1, 2, and its players are the law enforcement
authority (henceforth ’the authority’) and a pool of potential criminals. The goal of
the authority is to minimize the total amount of crime that a criminal will commit over
both periods. One could also incorporate a time-discount factor if one considers that
appropriate. Using xt to denote the intensity of crime committed by a criminal in period
t , the authority aims to minimize the expected value of:
LA ≡ x1 + x2 (1)
It does so by threatening to punish criminals at the end of period 2 for any crimes that
they have committed during periods 1 and 2. Importantly our model refers to that class of
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crimes where a perpetrator can be costlessly detected but that it takes time to apprehend
him or her (if at all). For instance, a kidnapper in hiding or dictator or warlord with a
standing army.4 Consequently, the criminal has an intermediate phase available during
which he is able to play a game with the authority. The length of a period is indeterminate,
so readers may think of the model’s time horizon as they consider appropriate.
Suppose, initially, that the authority can credibly commit to ex-post punishment and
that it adopts a punishment function given by h(x1 + x2) = φ [x1 + x2], where the value
of φ > 0 is known to all agents in the model. This parameter combines the actual
punishment conditional on the criminal being tried and convicted, with the probability
that a criminal will be caught and brought to court - so φ is the expected punishment
parameter, which we assume can be increased through increased commitment to punish
a perpetrator.5
We assume that the criminal derives benefits from committing the crime xt. These
take the form of monetary rewards.
Engaging in criminal activity is costly however, both in terms of opportunity cost and
direct costs. We assume that the criminal’s cost function of committing xt crimes is given
by c(xt) = γxt. The value of γ > 0 is known to all agents in the model.
The criminal’s objective is to maximize his or her own lifetime utility, which - after













Here, θ ≥ 0 is a time-invariant parameter capturing the criminal’s type, which one
could interpret as his intrinsic malevolence. A crucial part of the model is that the value
of θ is private information to the criminal. The authority can only form beliefs about
it by observing the criminal’s behavior in period 1. We assume that θ is distributed
according to some known cumulative distribution function F (θ) in the pool of criminals
and associated probability density function f(θ).
From solving the optimization problem (2), we can see that the first-order condition
4It for example took two wars and many sanctions - spanning a period of about 13 years - to remove
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.
5Specifically, we view φ as a reduced form parameter that could be defined as φ = π.m, where π is
the probability that a criminal will be caught and brought to court, while m captures the magnitude of
punishment for a given crime. We assume that it is not feasible to set m prohibitively high due to notions
of proportionality and laws against torture and that it is already set at its maximum feasible level. For
our purposes, we focus on cases where expected punishment φ is increased by authorities increasing their
commitment to punish wrongdoers (acknowledging that π could also be increased by increases in policing,
better functioning courts, etc).
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for t = 1, 2 (3)
So at the beginning of period 2 (after observing x1) the authority is able to make an
inference about the criminal’s type θ by using (3), leading to:
E
A
2 {θ|x1} = [γ + φ] x1, (4)
where γ, φ, and x1 are all known at this stage.
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2.2 Partial Commitment
So far, we have maintained the strong assumption that the authority is ex ante able to
commit itself to punishing the criminal ex post according to some pre-specified punishment
function h(·). In reality, however, such a perfect form of commitment is unlikely to be
possible. Although the authority is able to increase the costs of allowing impunity (for
example by creating laws or signing treaties that bind itself), it is unlikely to be able to
increase these costs all the way up to infinity (which is necessary for perfect commitment).
Indeed, in both examples in the introduction (Italian kidnapping laws and the Rome
Statute) there are escape clauses for exceptional circumstances.
Therefore, let us suppose that the authority incurs a loss equal to a finite Λ ≥ 0 if it
ignores the punishment function h(·) at the beginning of period 2 and allows impunity,
in return for the criminal ceasing to inflict harm.7 Since the criminal’s capture only takes
place at the end of period 2, our model highlights the idea that a deal is able to bring an
end to the harm earlier.
Λ can encompass many different costs: some are institution-related (such as the loss of
credibility for the authority or loss of prestige for law enforcement officials), while others
would occur in any environment (such as the moral hazard for future criminals). We will
assume that:
Assumption 1 Λ is an increasing function of φ, i.e. Λ = Λ (φ) with dΛ (φ) /dφ > 0
6We take the criminal’s cost parameter γ to be public knowledge, but one could also assume that this
information is private to the criminal (γ then takes over the role that θ plays in the current setup).
7Alternatively, one can interpret this as the law enforcement authority adhering to a rule that has an
explicit escape clause. As shown by Lohmann (1992), the outcome under such a rule typically dominates
that obtained under full commitment, so in that sense such a policy can also be optimal. Interestingly,
the Rome Statute of the ICC contains explicit escape clauses - see especially its Articles 16, 17 and 53.
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and Λ (0) ≥ 0.
Our assumption that dΛ (φ) /dφ > 0 captures the intuitive notion that if the authority
announces ex ante that it is going to prosecute these type of criminals with higher proba-
bility (thereby increasing expected punishment φ), then the (reputational) loss associated
with reneging on its commitment will be greater.8
The solution-concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Denoting the authority’s action
at the beginning of period 2 by s ∈ {deal,punish}, the equilibrium can be defined as:
Definition A pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a strategy profile (xeqt , s
eq)
and a system of beliefs µ (θ|x1) such that:
1. After observing x1, and given beliefs µ (θ|x1), the authority chooses an action s
eq(x1)
that minimizes its expected loss function EA2 {L|x1}.
2. The beliefs µ (θ|x1) held by the authority about the criminal’s type θ are obtained
through Bayes’ rule, where possible.
3. Taking the authority’s best response seq(x1) into account, a criminal of type θ decides
to commit crimes xeqt (θ) that maximize his utility.
We denote the value of the impunity offer to the criminal by V I . It consists of the value
that the criminal attaches to not being tried (or receiving only a minor punishment), as
well as of any potential additional benefits. In order to induce the criminal to accept
the offer, the authority will have to set V I > θ log (x∗2) − γx
∗
2 − φ [x1 + x
∗
2]. The RHS
of this inequality represents the value of the criminal’s outside option. Note that the
exact location of this “threat point” is private information to the criminal, because θ is
private information. Due to the resulting informational advantage of the criminal over the
authority, the criminal is able to exploit this edge when negotiating on V I (see e.g. Sobel
and Takahashi (1983) on how a party that is better informed is also able to achieve a
better bargaining outcome). In particular, we assume that the criminal is able to capture
8As we show in Appendix A2, the results that are to follow are robust to using the more general function
Λ (φ, φx1) with ∂Λ (φ, φx1) /∂φ > 0 and ∂Λ (φ, φx1) /∂ (φx1) > 0. The second argument φx1, which
is punishment for first-period crimes according to the pre-specified punishment function (“punishment
according to the law”), can now be thought of as representing a loss resulting from “not doing justice”.
Assuming that ∂Λ (φ, φx1) /∂ (φx1) > 0 makes it costlier to allow impunity to those who acted worse
in period 1. This allows for the idea that there might be more public outcry if amnesty is granted to a
criminal who behaved very badly in period 1 and should have received a large punishment according to
the strict letter of the law (i.e.: a criminal with high φx1).
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rents ∆ > 0 in the deal negotiations, such as a nice place to spend his post-criminal years.
Consequently, V I takes the following “outside-option plus surplus”-form:
V I (θ, φ) = θ log (x∗2)− γx
∗
2 − φ [x1 + x
∗
2] + ∆ (5)
Because the authority’s promise of impunity post-deal might not be fully credible
either, V I can be seen as an expected value to the criminal.9 In equation (5), the size of the
bargaining-surplus ∆ may depend upon various factors, such as the criminal’s negotiation
skills relative to those of the authority and the urgency of the situation. We leave these
components un-modeled and furthermore set ∂∆/∂EA2 {θ|x1} = 0. This implies that any
strategic behavior that a criminal is going to display, is not going to arise with the aim of
increasing negotiation-rents ∆ - only with the aim of unlocking the impunity deal in the
first place.









if an impunity deal is made
otherwise
(1’)
This modified loss function expresses the idea that if the criminal escapes via an
impunity deal, x2 is expected to collapse to zero. But by making such a deal, the authority
simultaneously incurs a loss of Λ (φ), due to a loss of credibility, or due to moral hazard
for future criminals.
Remembering that the authority is only able to infer the incumbent criminal’s type
from his first-period behavior, its beginning of period 2 expectation of the crimes that the









One can then see from the modified loss function (1’) that the impunity deal will








≥ Λ (φ) ⇔ EA2 {θ|x1} ≥ (γ + φ) Λ (φ) (7)
When this condition holds, the criminal is believed to be of such a bad type θ, that
the loss the authority expects to incur if it adheres to its earlier intention to punish
9Note that the model’s solution is fully determined by expected values where applicable.
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the criminal, is larger than the loss associated with allowing impunity. In those cases,
the authority prefers to end the harm. Here, the effective punishment function becomes
non-monotonic.
At this stage, one can define the critical type θ̂. This type is defined such that when
the criminal adheres to his FOC (3), and sets x1 = x̂1 ≡ θ̂/(γ+φ), the authority’s rational











= (γ + φ) Λ (φ) (8)
Henceforth, we will refer to those criminals with θ ≥ θ̂, as the “bad” ones: by adhering
to their FOC, the authority is better off by offering them impunity in return for them
escaping to another jurisdiction.
Most importantly, for a criminal of type θ < θ̂, unlocking the impunity deal calls
for setting x1 > x
∗
1 (the latter choice being given by the FOC (3)). In those cases,
a reasoning, “Beckerian” criminal who recognizes the finiteness of the authority’s loss
associated with allowing impunity, may choose to make an “investment” in period 1. The
criminal “invests” by committing more crimes than he would actually like to from a static
perspective - purely for the sake of unlocking the impunity-option, so that he can in the
end walk away with no (or only a minor) punishment.
In this case, the criminal uses period 1 to try and signal that he is of the bad type
(i.e.: that he is of a type θ ≥ θ̂) thereby threatening that he will commit many crimes in
period 2 as well. So many, that the authority is actually better off by making an impunity
deal at the beginning of period 2.10 The criminal is trading off the loss of not being at the
static optimum in the first period, with the dynamic gain of being able to enjoy an exit
of the game via an impunity deal. With reference to the behavior of Bosco Ntaganda, we
will call this the “Terminator effect”.
Note that these investments (or signaling costs) are only going to be worthwhile for
those criminals whose true preference parameter θ is sufficiently close to θ̂, so it only pays
for the high θ types to try and mimic the period 1 behavior of “bad” criminals. To see
10This is very much like the strategy employed by Bosco Ntaganda (nicknamed “The Terminator”)
who attacked the city of Goma in 2008 not because he was interested in its control, but only because he
“wanted to make the government sit at the negotiating table” (see BBC 2012). In the 2012 documentary
Peace vs. Justice, ICC-investigator Matthew Brubacher compares this behavior of dictators and warlords
to blackmailing. He states: “It’s essentially blackmailing. They kill as massively, as intensively, and as
brutally as possible until the international community basically puts up its hand and says: ‘OK, let’s
just go for peace. We’ll give you money, we’ll give you food, we’ll give you whatever you want - just stop
killing people.’ ”
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this, start by noting that a criminal whose θ < θ̂ can adopt two strategies:
F . Follow the FOC (3), after which he expects punishment at the end of period 2.
D. Deviate from the FOC (3) in period 1, to unlock the amnesty offer at the beginning
of period 2 (which results in a final pay-off equal to V I).
What is the utility that a type θ-criminal derives from these options? Let us first analyze
the value from following strategy F , henceforth indicated by UF . Since the criminal
chooses to set x1 = x2 = θ/ [γ + φ] by FOC (3), it follows that:






Given that we focus on criminals with θ < θ̂, setting x1 according to the FOC (3)
does not unlock the impunity-option (because x∗1 < x̂1 for those types, with x̂1 being the
critical level of first-period crimes that unlocks the impunity-option).
The cheapest way for such a criminal to unlock the impunity-option nevertheless,
would be to mimic a type θ̂-criminal by setting x1 = x̂1 (this is strategy D).
11 Following
this strategy would yield a criminal of type θ < θ̂ lifetime utility:
UD = θ log (x̂1)− γx̂1 + V
I(θ, φ) (10)
Hence, a criminal of type θ < θ̂ will invest in committing crimes (and pool with the
“bad” types) in period 1 iff his θ is such that UD ≥ UF , i.e. iff:
y(θ, φ) ≡ θ log (x̂1)− γx̂1 + V





+ 2θ ≥ 0 (11)
When y(θ, φ) = 0, it implicitly defines the critical type θ beyond which a crimi-
nal becomes willing to invest in first-period crime for the sole purpose of unlocking the
amnesty-option in period 2, such that he can exit via the amnesty route, enjoying V I(θ, φ).
We then know from combining equations (5) and (11) that θ should satisfy:









− θ̂ +∆ = 0 (12)
11After all, since x̂1 > x
∗
1, the marginal benefits from committing crimes are lower than its marginal
costs at this point, as a result of which it will never be optimal for a criminal to go beyond that level of
crime (setting x1 = x̂1 suffices to unlock the amnesty-option, so setting x1 > x̂1 only brings additional
net costs).
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Assuming that ∆ < θ̂,12 there exists a θ < θ̂ for which y(θ, φ) = 0 (because y (·) is a
continuous function with y(0, φ) < 0, y(θ̂, φ) > 0, and ∂y(θ, φ)/∂θ|θ=θ > 0). Consequently,
all types θ ∈ [θ, θ̂) will find it optimal to mimic the θ̂-type by setting x1 = x̂1. The reason
is that in the face of a commitment problem for authorities, it pays to be very bad, rather
than just a little bad.
At this stage, we are also able to specify how the authority forms its expectation about
the criminal’s type θ in Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium after observing the criminal’s choice

















[γ + φ] x1
when x1 = x̂1
otherwise
(13)
The intuition is that when the authority observes x̂1 ≡ θ̂/ [γ + φ] (that level of crime
which is just enough to unlock the impunity-option), the naive expectation would be to
assume that the criminal is exactly of type θ̂ (this would follow from blindly applying
equation (4)). In equilibrium, however, the authority realizes that x̂1 could also be set by
a criminal of type θ ∈ [θ, θ̂), who is trying to mimic a criminal of type θ̂ so as to unlock




θ|θ ≤ θ ≤ θ̂
}
< θ̂ implying that the authority “discounts” the criminal’s first-period
behavior somewhat as it realizes that he might just be mimicking a bad criminal, without
actually being one himself.14
To close the model, we still need to specify how the authority would respond if an
out-of-equilibrium action (call that x̃) were to be observed - otherwise there is a plethora
of equilibria. We impose that µ (θ|x̃) = [γ + φ] x̃ ≡ θ̃. This implies that any out-of-
equilibrium action is interpreted as coming from a criminal-type whose FOC (3) prescribes
that action. Next to this belief seeming reasonable if one assumes that the authority allows
for the possibility that some criminals may act non-strategically (dogmatically adhering
to their FOC instead), it also survives the D1 refinement-arguments in Cho and Kreps
(1987).15
12Otherwise y(θ, φ) > 0 ∀θ and we end up in a situation where all types with θ > 0 are going to mimic.
This would actually strengthen our results, but strikes us as being rather extreme.
13We thank Avinash Dixit for pointing out an error in equation (13) in an earlier draft.
14Remember that, by equation (8), the authority becomes indifferent between impunity and punishment
at type
...
θ ≡ (γ + φ) Λ(φ) if the criminal’s type were publicly observable. But since θ is hidden in our
model, the authority discounts any first-period behavior as a result of which a criminal has to mimic a
type θ̂ >
...
θ to unlock the impunity-option.
15See Ramey (1996) who extends the D1-criterion to a continuum of types. While semi-pooling equi-
libria are often ruled out along these lines, it is sustained in our framework. The reason is the fact that
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At this point, we know that θ should solve (12), while θ̂ solves equation (8) (with
E
A
2 {θ|x1} being formed as in (13)). Assuming for concreteness that θ ∼ U(0, θmax], we
have EA2 {θ|x̂1} = (θ + θ̂)/2 and condition (8) implies:
θ̂ = 2 (γ + φ) Λ (φ)− θ (14)
Substituting this into (12) gives the following implicit equation characterizing θ:
y(θ, φ) = θ log
(
2 (γ + φ) Λ (φ)− θ
θ
)
+ 2θ − 2 (γ + φ) Λ (φ) + ∆ = 0 (15)
This completes the solution for this part of the model.
2.3 Entry
What remains is a description of entry into criminal activity. At the beginning of period
1, there is a pool M of potential malevolent criminals (of type θ > 0). The potential
criminals are only interested in maximizing their own private pay-off. Entering the crim-
inal activity requires the payment of a fixed (and sunk) entry cost E > 0, after which the
agent will initiate the criminal activity, which has success-probability p.
These agents are distributed according to cumulative distribution function F (θ), with
support (0, θmax]. Upon observing their private draw of θ, these malevolent agents decide
whether to initiate the criminal activity.
Now consider a criminal with θ < θ. By definition of θ, he does not want to unlock
the impunity-option by mimicking a bad criminal, because doing so is too costly for him
given his type. Instead, he will follow his FOC, which would bring him lifetime utility as
described by equation (9). Consequently, a type θ agent would only want to initiate the
the action of the receiver in our game (the authority) is binary: it offers immunity, or it sticks to ex-post
punishment. This implies that θ̂-types have no incentive to try and separate themselves from lower,
mimicking types.
In addition, the semi-pooling equilibrium is stable in the sense that there can never be profitable
deviation. Assume a mimicking criminal deviates from the equilibrium by choosing x1 = x̂1 + ε, then he
would unlock the impunity option but would incur a higher cost (see discussion page 12 and footnote 11)
than he would have, had he decided to adhere to the equilibrium. This is because MB(x̂1+ε) < MB(x̂1)
while MC(x̂1 + ε) > MC(x̂1) where MB and MC refer to the marginal benefit and marginal cost,
respectively. As a result, a mimicking criminal is never better off by deviating from the equilibrium
x1 = x̂1. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium is stable for those criminals.
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criminal activity if:









− E ≥ 0 (16)
When z(θ, φ) = 0, it defines the critical level θ below which potential malevolent
criminals do not find it worthwhile to initiate the crime.16 The function p (θ) (with
dp(θ)/dθ > 0) captures the idea that any given individual initiating a crime has a higher
probability of success, if the number of initiators is relatively low (which is the case when
the entry threshold θ is high).17
We furthermore impose that at least some malevolent criminals are willing to initiate
a crime (which is the whole premise of this paper). This requires γ + φ < θ, otherwise
z(θ, φ) < 0 ∀θ.18
Potential criminals of type θ < θ are deterred by the severe punishment for crimes.
As a result it is not worthwhile for them to pay the entrance fee E to engage in a criminal
activity. Consequently, only a fraction [1− F (θ)] out of the pool of potential malevolent
criminals will decide to initiate such a crime.
2.4 Summary
In summary, our model leads to four groups of malevolent criminals:
• The “petty criminals” with 0 < θ < θ. They choose not to initiate a crime because
of the entry fee E ; their low θ implies that they are not able to derive enough utility
from committing crimes to make up for that fee.
• The “ordinary criminals” with θ ≤ θ < θ. This group chooses to commit a crime, but
for them it is too costly to change their behavior in order to unlock the impunity-
option. Consequently, they merely stick to their FOCs and optimally choose to
undergo the punishment at the end of period 2. In other words, these criminals
are unable to mimic the behavior of the bad types, for whom θ ≥ θ̂, due to costly
signaling.
16We assume E to be low enough such that θ < θ, otherwise all entering malevolent criminals will again
choose to mimic the bad ones. As noted before, such a specification would strengthen the results that
are to follow, but strikes us as being rather extreme.
17See Friedman and Sjostrom (1993) who model the success of criminal activity on a pool of potential
offenders.
18Note that θ is unique, as z (·) is a continuous function with z(θ, φ)|θ<θ < 0, z(θ, φ)|θ>θ > 0, and
∂z(θ, φ)/∂θ > 0.
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• The “mimicking criminals” with θ ≤ θ < θ̂. This is an interesting group, as they
choose to modify their first-period behavior by “investing” in committing more or
more gruesome first-period crimes, for the sole purpose of unlocking the impunity-
option at the beginning of period 2. In signaling terms, they are able to mimic and
form a pooling equilibrium with the bad criminals. These types are actively trying
to break the authority’s earlier commitment to ex-post punishment.
• The “bad criminals” with θ ≥ θ̂. For them, following the FOCs already suffices
to unlock the impunity option– no additional investments are necessary. Note that
criminals in this group have no incentive to try and form a separating equilibrium
(as this is costly to them, without delivering any benefits).
All of these thresholds are unique and satisfy the ordering θ < θ < θ̂ - as discussed in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
3 COMPARATIVE STATICS
We are now able to analyze what would happen if the authority raises the expected pun-
ishment parameter φ. To answer this question, it is crucial to analyze the comparative
statics of the various thresholds with respect to φ, which is done in Propositions 1-4.
Analytical results can be obtained when θ is assumed to follow a uniform distribution.
Numerical analysis using other distributions on the positive domain for θ (such as the
log-normal, and the generalized Pareto) suggests that our results apply more generally
(See Appendix B). It is moreover possible to solve the model without making any distri-
butional assumptions on θ if one supposes that the authority is boundedly rational and
naively applies (4) (rather than (13)) when forming EA2 {θ|x1}. Reassuringly, our findings
are robust to that specification as well.
Proposition 1.
(i) Provided that some malevolent types are willing to initiate a crime (which is the
case when θ > γ+φ), an increase in expected punishment raises the entry-threshold. That
is: ∂θ/∂φ > 0.
(ii) An increase in expected punishment reduces the likelihood of initiating a crime while
selecting more malevolent criminals. That is: ∂ Pr [1M = 1] /∂φ < 0 and ∂E {θ|θ≥ θ} /∂φ >
0.
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(iii) An increase in entry cost raises the entry-threshold. That is: ∂θ/∂E > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A1.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in φ raises the threshold beyond which potential
criminals become willing to initiate a crime (imposing that at least some malevolent
criminals are willing to try, i.e. θ > γ + φ).19 Consequently, the greater the authority’s
commitment to prosecuting criminal activities (modeled by a higher expected punishment
φ), the lower the fraction [1− F (θ)] of potential criminals that will decide to initiate a
crime. This is the deterrence effect (captured by equation (A1)). A higher entry cost
into criminal activities also deters entry. As a result, the probability that a crime is
initiated decreases with the expected punishment parameter φ or with increased entry
cost E , which is intuitive.
However, conditional on a crime being initiated, a greater expected punishment pa-
rameter also selects criminals who, on average, will be of a worse type. The reason is that
the deterrence effect only drives out potential petty criminals (with a relatively low θ).
Thus, the benign deterrence effect is accompanied by a malign adverse selection effect.
Which of these two effects dominates depends on the distribution of θ.
Similarly, we can establish how increased expected punishment affects thresholds θ
and θ̂.
Proposition 2. An increase in expected punishment raises the threshold beyond
which criminals become willing to invest in committing crimes. That is: ∂θ/∂φ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A1.
Remember that all criminals of type θ > θ will choose to form a pooling equilibrium
with the θ̂-types. With respect to the location of this level, it holds that:
Proposition 3. An increase in expected punishment raises the threshold beyond
which the authority chooses to enter into an impunity deal. That is: ∂θ̂/∂φ > 0.
19Since the last term in the denominator of ∂θ/∂φ is positive (see the expression in Appendix A1), this
condition is actually stricter than necessary. But given that this paper starts from the observation that
some malevolent criminals are willing to attempt to commit a crime, we maintain it nevertheless as it
maximizes both clarity as well as descriptive realism without serious loss of generality.
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Proof: See Appendix A1.
This proposition is intuitive given that the costs of granting an impunity deal ex post
are increasing in φ (remember that dΛ(φ)/dφ > 0). It implies that when φ is higher,
criminals of type θ < θ̂ will have to put in a greater mimicking effort (commit more
gruesome acts) if they want to unlock the amnesty-option.
With respect to the size of the mimicking group, which is increasing in (θ̂ − θ), one
can show that:
Proposition 4. The size of the mimicking group is increasing in expected punish-
ment. That is: ∂(θ̂ − θ)/∂φ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A1.
This proposition indicates that as φ increases, more criminals become subject to the
Terminator effect and choose to worsen their behavior to unlock the impunity-option. The
reason is that with greater expected punishment φ, exit via the impunity-escape route
becomes relatively more valuable. Consequently, more become willing to pool with the
bad types at θ̂.





θ ∈ [θ̂, θmax]. They just choose to adhere to their FOCs (given by (3)). As shown in the
following proposition, the prospect of higher punishment at the end of period 2 induces
them to commit less crime:
Proposition 5. Ordinary and bad criminals, that is those criminals with θ ∈[
θ, θ
)
∪ [θ̂, θmax] are disciplined by increases in expected punishment. That is: ∂x
∗
t /∂φ < 0.
Proof: See Appendix A1.
Combining these results (summarized in Table 1), tells us that increasing φ (and hence
Λ(φ)) will lead to greater dispersion in outcomes. On the one hand, two benign effects
will ensue: there will be fewer crimes because of (i) the deterrence effect captured by




or θ ∈ [θ̂, θmax] will
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be disciplined (Proposition 5). On the other hand, there will be two opposing malign ef-
fects: first, the malevolence of active criminals rises due to adverse selection (see equation
(A3)); and mimicking criminals will commit more crimes (the so-called Terminator effect),
as this is now necessary to unlock the impunity-option (Proposition 3).20 In addition, the
size of this mimicking group (determined by θ̂ − θ) increases with φ (Proposition 4) - so
increased expected punishment leads to a worse type of criminal who will choose to act
worse for strategic reasons.
<Table 1 About Here>
Whether the expected net effect is benign or malign depends on a number of factors
including: (i) the reputation loss incurred by the authority if they allow impunity for a
perpetrator, Λ(φ); (ii) the distribution of θ; and (iii) the entry cost into criminal activity
E . We briefly discuss the policy implications of each of these factors below.
Regarding the first factor, the shape of the reputational loss function associated with
impunity Λ(φ) as well as the parameters that govern this function, would seem to be
largely exogenous to the law enforcement authority. The magnitude of the commitment
to punish which translates into expected punishment φ is the only element under its
control. Interestingly, this function may vary across regulators or over time. For instance,
the moral hazard costs of allowing a wrongdoer to go unpunished are likely to be lower
near the end of a regulator’s tenure than at the beginning.21
In terms of the distribution of criminal by type (θ), our analysis implies that a re-
duction in the proportion of ’mimicking’ and ’bad’ types committing crimes will lead
to reduction of the malign effects generated by an increase in the commitment to pun-
ish22. Our analysis also shows that if the fixed entry costs to criminal activity (E) can
be increased, fewer individuals will partake in such criminal behavior in the first place.
Both of these results highlight the limitations of relying solely on ex post punishment
measures for such crimes and suggest that policy makers need to complement them with
preventative (ex ante) measures. Specifically, our analysis suggests that policy makers
20While both the deterrence effect and the adverse selection effect are unconditional in that they apply
to any type θ, the disciplining effect and the Terminator effect, on the other hand, are conditional in that
they apply only to some types of criminals as defined above.
21This insight may explain why U.S. presidents have a reputation for granting pardons just before they
leave office - as the costs (both in terms of reputation and moral hazard) of allowing wrongdoers to go
unpunished are likely to be much lower at that stage of their tenure.
22For instance, if the distribution of θ is such that the size of mimicking group increases faster than
the size of the ordinary criminals group while the size of the bad criminals group decreases a lot as θ̂
increases, then the Terminator effect is likely to outweigh the disciplining effect, all things being equal.
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should consider increasing the entry costs of individuals with relatively high levels of in-
trinsic malevolence. This could be done by increasing the opportunity cost of criminal
activity and providing them with opportunities for pro-social activities (such as legitimate
employment opportunities) and engaging in diversionary programs for those at high risk
(such as gang members). For those who have been proven to have high levels of intrin-
sic malevolence (or a willingness to mimic such an attribute) our analysis points toward
incapacitation and efforts focused upon altering such intrinsic character traits.23
In summary, our model shows that when authorities lack a perfect commitment mech-
anism, increased expected punishment through increased commitment to punish may
paradoxically lead to more and worse crimes being committed (if the Terminator and
adverse selection effect outweigh the disciplining and deterrence effect). This forms a
striking contrast with standard “Beckerian” models of criminal activity where increases
in expected punishment tends to reduce crime. While we have focused our examples on
kidnappers and warlords, we consider that our analysis has other applications, such as
when governments face powerful criminals, hostile political actors or insurgencies, dealing
with whistleblowers, and even when firms make threats to rivals.24
4 CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed an enforcement problem for a special class of crime. This class of
crime concerns cases where the criminal can be easily detected but not easily apprehended
(at least for some period time time). In those cases, the criminal has the ability to inflict
significant harm in the interim period between detection and apprehension. Criminals
may therefore actively engage in strategic behavior to try to force authorities to ignore
earlier commitments to severe punishment. In such an environment, it is dangerous for
regulators to try to commit, particularly when they lack a perfect commitment technology.
Our model identifies two benign effects associated with higher expected punishment:
first of all, there will be a deterrence effect - leading to fewer malevolent criminals in the
future. Secondly, some malevolent criminals will be disciplined. Simultaneously, however,
more malevolent offenders who will choose to commit more atrocities when faced with
a higher expected punishment (to try and force authorities to grant an impunity deal).
23For instance, see Komorosky and O’Neal (2015) who analyze (mainly youth) programs designed to
develop empathy and pro-social behavior.
24The implications of our analysis may even apply to more mundane disciplinary situations such as
those involving teachers and parents, where behaving worse can generate a non-monotonic punishment
function.
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Dispersion in outcomes will therefore go up, so parties involved should ask themselves
whether they consider such polarization to be a desirable outcome. In summary, while
commitment should reduce the instances of these crimes, those that do occur are likely
to be worse and more gruesome.
Our results are largely positive (as opposed to normative), but they do provide some
policy guidance. At their most fundamental they show the inadequacy of relying on
ex post punishment measures to deter certain types of criminal activity and highlight
the need for complementary ex ante (preventative) measures. Indeed, for this class of
crime, authorities may do better to devote their efforts toward engaging in preventative
measures rather than attempting to increase their commitment to punish. Finding the
right institutional response to this class of crimes has the ability to greatly increase social
welfare. For one, while the types of crimes analyzed above are relatively rare, they can
strike terror into a populace. Second, in an international law context, the stakes can be
high, and a design-flaw may cost millions of lives.
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APPENDIX A: FORMAL ANALYSIS
A1. Proofs: Propositions 1-5 with Λ = Λ (φ)
Proposition 1 (i) When θ > γ + φ, ∂θ/∂φ > 0.
Proof. The threshold θ is implicitly defined by z(θ, φ) = 0 (with z following the specifi-
















Since E >0, condition (16) shows that malevolent criminals with θ > θ will only be
willing to run for criminal activity when γ + φ < θ. Recalling that 0 < p (θ) < 1 and
dp (θ) /dθ > 0, this immediately implies that ∂θ/∂φ > 0.
(ii) ∂ Pr [1M = 1] /∂φ < 0 and ∂E {θ|θ≥ θ} /∂φ > 0
Let 1M be an indicator function that takes the value 1 for the pool of potential
criminals. The ex-ante probability of this event occurring is:
Pr [1M = 1] = 1− F (θ),
with:







< 0, since ∂θ/∂φ > 0 (A2)
In addition, since E {θ|1M = 1} = E {θ|θ≥ θ}, it holds that:
∂E {θ|θ≥ θ}
∂φ
> 0, again because ∂θ/∂φ > 0. (A3)















Proposition 2 ∂θ/∂φ > 0.
Proof. The threshold θ is implicitly defined by y(θ, φ) = 0. Differentiating y (specified
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(γ + φ) Λ (φ)− θ
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Proposition 3 ∂θ̂/∂φ > 0.
































 > 0 (A7)
Proposition 4 ∂(θ̂ − θ)/∂φ > 0.





































+ θ/θ̂ − 1
)
. To de-
termine the latter, define q ≡ θ̂/θ > 1 and f(q) ≡ log (q) + 1/q − 1. When f(q) > 0, we
have that ∂(θ̂ − θ)/∂φ > 0. One can show that this indeed is the case for q > 1 by using
the Lambert function W (z), for which it holds that W (z) exp (W (z)) = z. To see that















































By the defining property of the Lambert function we know that W (−1/q exp (−1/q)) =




⇔ q > 1,
which is the case since q ≡ θ̂/θ and θ < θ̂.
Proposition 5 ∂x∗t /∂φ < 0.




∪ [θ̂, θmax], set xt according to FOC (3). The proof
then follows immediately from differentiating that expression.
A2. Generalized specification with Λ = Λ (φ, φx1)
In this Appendix we show that all propositions stated in Section 3 are robust to using the
more general Λ = Λ(φ, φx1), with Λ1 ≡ ∂Λ (φ, φx1) /∂φ > 0 and Λ2 ≡ ∂Λ (φ, φx1) /∂ (φx1) >
0. Having Λ2 > 0 captures the idea that it is costlier for the authority to allow impunity
to criminals who behave worse in period 1 and should have received a large punishment
according to the strict letter of the law. Propositions 1 and 5 are not affected by this
modification, so we only have to check Propositions 2, 3, and 4.
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θ − (γ + φ)Λ (φ, φx̂1)
2(γ + φ)Λ (φ, φx̂1)− θ
]
Now recall that θ̂ = 2(γ+φ)Λ (φ, φx̂1)−θ, which implies
θ̂−θ
2


























where Ψ ≡ Λ (φ, φx̂1) + (γ + φ)Λ1 (φ, φx̂1) +
γθ̂
γ+φ

































which proves Proposition 2 for the case in which Λ = Λ(φ, φx1).
Using straightforward calculus, one can subsequently show that the derivative central

















which confirms Proposition 3.

































− 1 > 0 for θ̂
θ
> 1, this proves Proposition 4.
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APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS OF THE DISTRIBU-
TIONAL ASSUMPTIONS ON θ
B1. Baseline Calibration
Functional specifications:
Λ(φ) = aφ+ b.
p(θ) = 1− exp (−νθ)
<Table B1 About here>
B2. Simulations of different distributional assumptions for θ
<Figure B1 About here>
<Figure B2 About here>
<Figure B3 About here>
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θ ∈ [θ , θ̂)





Table B1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Description
∆ 40 Bargaining surplus
E 5 Entry cost
γ 0.5 Unit cost of crime
φ [0.5;1] Expected punishment
ν 0.2 rate parameter (for p(θ))
a 10 Slope of Λ
b 56 Intercept of Λ
The baseline calibration was chosen to ensure that the support of the
uniform distribution lies between 0 and 100.
2
Figure B1: Baseline: θ follows a Uniform Distribution with θmin = 0 and θmax = 100

















































Figure 4: θ̂(φ)− θ̄(φ)
1
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Figure B2: Baseline: θ follows a Log-normal Distribution with µ = 2 and σ = 1















































Figure 4: θ̂(φ)− θ̄(φ)
2
Figure B3: Baseline: θ follows a Generalized Pareto Distribution with k = 1/0.7, σ = 1 and
θmin = 0













































Figure 4: θ̂(φ)− θ̄(φ)
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